1572. The other was a wholesale resettlement of the native popula tion, begun in 1570 and continued throughout his term of office. The policy of resettlement had been suggested some twenty years earlier, and an attempt to put it in effect was made on a small scale by To ledo's predecessor, Governor Castro. 2 It was Toledo who applied it to the whole Inca Empire, however.
The object of the resettlement program was to move the natives away from their traditional shrines and collect them into Spanish style towns (reducciones), where they would be under closer super vision by the civil authorities and by their parish priests. Since the program called for moving at least a million and a half people, it was a very spectacular undertaking, and its successful accomplishment is a great tribute to Toledo's organizing ability. The native nobility and religious leaders realized that the maintenance of their own position and of the Inca cultural tradition would be proportionately more difficult as Spanish control became more effective. They therefore made an attempt to buy off the viceroy at the beginning of his visita general (1570) (1571) (1572) (1573) (1574) (1575) , offering to raise a payment of 800,000 pesos if he would abandon the resettlement program.
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The offer was rejected. Toledo's drastic measures mark the true end of the Spanish con quest in Peru. They brought home to the whole native population, as no earlier events had done, the fact that Spanish rule was intended to be permanent, and they convinced the Inca leaders that further active resistance was hopeless. It was not until about ninety years after 'I'oledo's administration that there was any more significant Inca po litical activity, apart from isolated complaints of local Spanish abuses.
The Spanish settlers in their security soon came to ignore the Incas, except as a convenient source of labor and money. The Incas for their part were careful not to be too conspicuous, fearing ridicule or persecution. Many Inca traditions were maintained, however, and much of Inca culture was only superficially altered. Even a nucleus of Inca leadership survived in the form of a hereditary native no bility, the caciques, descendants of the Inca governors and other officials who had been confirmed in office by the Spanish conquerors.
In Spanish law, the caciques were hereditary officials charged with civil and criminal jurisdiction over their subjects under the super "Levillier, 1921·26, Vol. III, pp. 277-278, 342 . • Toledo, in Romero, 1924, pp. 190-191. • Very few of the records of the resettlement, one of the most important events in Inca and Peruvian colonial history, have yet come to light. Toledo's instruc tions to the visitadores who carried it out have been published by Romero (1924) , and a summary of the resettlement of the province of Condesuyos del Cuzco is also available (Ulloa, 1908) .
vision of Spanish authorities. They were exempt from tribute and forced labor, and they had the right to have their cases tried directly by the audiencias, bypassing the authority of the corregido res who were their immediate superiors. They were permitted the use of the title" don" and were entitled to honors similar to those of the hidal gos of Castile. 5 The caciques had a special incentive to maintain and transmit Inca cultural traditions, for their title to office was based on the fact that an ancestor had belonged to the Inca nobility. This principle was repeatedly recognized by the Spanish courts.'; After 1619 the viceregal government provided special schools for the sons of caciques. These schools were under Jesuit administration and apparently offered an excellent education by the standards of the time and place. 7 There were 2,078 caciques in the viceroyalty of Peru in 1754. 8 The descendants of the Inca emperors made up another privileged group the nobility of which was recognized by the Spanish govern ment. There was some overlap, for many of the caciques also claimed royal descentY By about 1660 the caciques, many of whom were educated gentle men of some wealth, began to be seriously concerned at the extortion and abuses to which their people were subject, and they undertook to speak out as Inca leaders. The earliest evidence of such political activity which has so far come to light is a memorial addressed to the king by Antonio Collatopa, cacique of Cajamarca, some time before 1664. It is a protest in the name of all the Inca caciques against the abuses practiced by the corregidores and curas doctrineros. Collatopa apparently got to court and had his memorial printed in lVIadrid. 10 Protests brought no improvement in the colonial situation, and the caciques grew bolder. In 1666-1667 they attempted to organize a gelwral revolt under the leadership of Gabriel lVIanco Capac. The headquarters of the plotters was in Lima, and the original plan was to set fire to the city and take advantage of the resulting confusion to massacre the Spanish residents. The movement was plagued by jealousies and disagreements, however, and one of the plotters be trayed it to the fiscal protector, who happened to be Diego de 1..e6n • Ayala, 1929-30, Vol. II, pp. 333-342. • Cf. Rowe, 1955, pp. 18-22. 7 Colegio de Caciques, 1923; Colegio de San Francisco de Borja, 1950 , 1951 . • Orellana, 1859 There has been much recent interest in caciques and descendants of Inca emperOJ'R. See Temple, 1937 Temple, , 1937 Temple, -40, 1942 Temple, , 1947a Temple, , 1947b Temple, , 1948a Temple, , 1948b Temple, , 1949 Temple, , lfl50c, 1950d Lohmann Villena, 1949b; IJuna, 1946; Vargas Ugarte, 1943; Bustos T,oRHda, 1951-53; Loayza, 1946; Pumaccahua Inca, 1956; Rowe, 1951. ,. Lohmann Villena, 1946, p. 240; Vargas Ugarte, 1949b, p. 199. Pinelo. Eight of the leaders were hanged, drawn, and quartered, but many others escaped. Gabriel Manco Capac made his way to Jauja where he attempted to revive the plot. This time it was betrayed because one of the participants made the mistake of mentioning it in \~onfession, and the priest immediately took the story to the civil authorities.!! The revolt of Gabriel Manco Capac was not a protest of loyal citi zens against bad government but an Inca revolt against the king and against Spaniards in general. The plotters intended to spread the rumor that a royal cedula had been issued reducing the Indians to slavery. It is a matter of some interest that they thought such a rumor would be believed.
The Inca activities of the 1660's marked the beginning of an Inca national movement which reached its greatest strength in the eight eenth century. The Inca nationalists fought colonial abuses by legal means, petitioned the king for something like equal rights for Indians, and, when peaceful measures proved ineffective, attempted to estab lish an independent Inca state by armed revolt. A brief chronologi cal summary will give some idea of the intensity of this activity.
In 1721 a worthy successor to Antonio Collatopa found his way to Spain and became the agent at court of the Inca caciques. He was Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, cacique of four towns in the valley of Chicama and a dcscendant of the ancient Chimu kings. He presented four printed memorials to the Spanish government listing Inca grievances (in 1722, 1724, 1729, and 1732) . In 1737-1738 a large scale Inca revolt brol,e out in Azangaro under Andres Ignacio Cacma Condori; the Spanish authorities who suppressed it found seventeen provinces implicated. The next year a plot to restore the Inca Em pire was discovered in Oruro. In 1742 a lone Inca adventurer named Juan Santos proclai med Inca independence to the forest tribes on the frontier of Tarma. His bowmen wiped out twenty-seven Franciscan missions in the tropical valleys and threatened the sierra back of Lima until 1761. 'rhe Inca nationalists in Lima sent two representatives to ~;pain in 1749 with memorials addressed to the king and to the pope; the next year they revived the plan of 1666 and plotted another general revolt. It was betrayed through the confessional, and the heads of its leaders were placed beside those of the rebels of 1666 yvhich still adorned the bridge at Lima.
The greatest of all Inca rebellions broke out in 1780 under the leadership of Tomas Catari and Jose Gabriel Thupa Amaro, following the failure of a series of attempts to secure redress of grievances by Lohmanll Villella, 1946, pp. 89-92; Vargas Ugarte, 1947, pp. 74-75. 11 legal means. At one time the rebels held the whole country from Cuzco to Tarija, except for a handful of Spanish garrison cities which were all under close siege. The revolt was finally put down in 1782 but flared up again briefly in Huarochiri in 1783.
The final Inca effort took place in the period of the wars of inde pendence. 'When the Angulo brothers started a criollo rebellion in Cuzco in 1814, the Inca cacique Mateo Pumaccahua joined them with an Inca army, hoping to achieve with criollo help what the Incas had so often failed to achieve by their own resources. After a number of successes, the Inca forces were scattered at Umachiri, and Pumaccahua was captured and executed at Sicuani in 1815,12
The record of Inca activity in the Colonial Period is thus one of repeated protest against Spanish rule and the conditions associated with it. Perhaps the Incas would have objected equally strongly to any form of alien rule, but there were many specific features of the Spanish system which they found intolerable. They felt the oppres sive character of the Spanish regime chiefly through the institutions of encomienda, corregidores, mita, land grants, and doctrina. Some observations on the way these institutions functioned in Peru will help to explain Inca reactions.
ENCOMIENDA. Que of the first institutions of exploitation in troduced in Peru was the encomienda, well known in its general fea tures to all students of the Spanish Empire,13 A number of special studies of the encomienda in Peru have appeared,14 but the subject is far from exhausted. All writers on this, as on so many other, colo nial subjects have emphasized the legal aspects of the problem and treated it mainly from the point of view of the Spanish government.
The fin;t encomiendas in Peru were granted by Pizarro, at least as early as 1534.
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They were grants of broad powers, entitling the enoomendero to the services of specified native districts. Within his district, the encomendero was entirely free to demand whatever tribute or personal service he saw fit. The unhappy results of this situation are described in some detail by Luis de Morales, writing ill 1541 16 12 The story of the Inca national movement is told in greater detail and with references to the sources in Rowe, 1955 . There has been much interest in the rebellion of Thupa Amaro in Peru in recent years, and some important collections of documents relating to it have been published. See especially Paz, 1952; Vargas Ugarte, 1951a; Valcarcel, 1944 Valcarcel, , 1946 Valcarcel, , 1947 Valcarcel, , 1948 Santisteban Ochoa, 1942; Lewin, 194:3; Archivo Historico del Cuzco, 1950; Temple, 1950a . The interpretive literature on this rebellion and on that of 1814 is also very abundant, though not of very high quality.
1:, Cf. Zavah, 19:35, 1949 . 14 Torres Saldamanc1o, 1879·80, 1900a Zurlmlowski, 1919; Belaunc1c Guinassi, 194:; . and Martel de Santoyo, writing in 1542. 17 No fixed assessment of payments and service obligations was made until the time of President Gasca, 1548 to 1550,18 The three published examples of Gasca's assessments are frightening documents,19 The natives were required to supply large amounts of money, miscellaneous food products, and manufactured goods, mostly delivered to the encomendero's town house which might be forty leagues away. All three of these assess ments include chickens, eggs and wheat as well as native produce, and those of Ilabaya and Conchucos include pigs. Gasca's assessments were certainly excessive, but even so they may well have been less than what the natives had been forced to pay before there was any assessment at al1. 20 In addition to the payments in money and kind, the natives were subject to a fixed amount of personal service, culti vating the encomendero's fields, guarding his animals, and serving his household. 'rhis service was performed by turns (mit'a) . There was an additional but smaller assessment in goods and services to support the priest assigned to the encomienda. No systematic re vision of Gasca's assessments was made until Viceroy Toledo's visita general (1570-1575), but personal service without pay was prohibited in encomienda grants of 1559 by the Marques de Caiiete. 21 The fixed assessments and abolition of personal service without pay caused some changes in the methods of exploitation used by the encomenderos. Nominal payments for services were made, and the encomenderos began trading on a large scale, mainly in coca and other supplies for Potosi. This commerce used native carriers or llamas belonging to the natives. The abuses of this period are described by Domingo de Santo Tomas 22 and Bartolome de Vega. 23 The situation of the Inca population appears to have been scarcely better than before the reforms.
The encomenderos were not satisfied with their advantages and, in 1550, sent representatives to Spain with large presents for the Em peror to ask that the encomiendas be made hereditary in perpetuity. It is said that the encomenderos of Peru offered 7,600,000 pesos for the privilege.
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A royal commission was sent out in 1559 to investi 17 Martel de Santoyo, 1943 . ,. Domingo de Santo Tom{lS to the king, 1550 , in Lisson Chaves, Vol. I, no. 4, p. 192. 19 IIabaya, 1549 , in Barriga, 1940 Pachacamac, 1549 , in Torres Saldamando, 1900a Conchucos, 1550 , in Gasca, 1875 . 20 Zavala, 1935 Ibid., p. 301.
22 Report of 1550 , in Lisson Chaves, 1943 Report of 1563 Report of , published 1867 23 Report of 1563 , published 1896 . .. Vargas Ugarte, 1949a gate and grant perpetuity if it proved desirable. The native caciques became seriously concerned and empowered Bartolome de las Oasas and Domingo de Santo Tomas to offer 100,000 ducats more than the top price offered by the encomenderos if the king would abolish the encomienda system altogether. 25 Neither extreme course proved ac ceptable to the Spanish government.
The institution of corregidores de indios in the provinces in 1565 drastically reduced the powers of the encomenderos over the people entrusted to them, and their prerogatives were further restricted by the new tribute assessments of Viceroy Toledo, which simplified the payments and reduced them where they were exceptionally heavy. With these developments the eneomienda took on the general form it was to maintain until its extinction in the first half of the eighteenth century. Guaman Poma de Ayala, writing in 1615, gives a vivid picture of the encomenderos' share in exploiting the natives at that date, and the terms of a cedula of the end of the seventeenth century indicate that complaints were still being made then. 26 OORREG IDORI~S. Before 1565, the Spanish administrative hierarchy in the former Inca Empire consisted of a governor or vice roy, three audiencias (Lima, 1542 , Oharcas, 1556 , and Quito, 1561 , and the corregidores who governed the Spanish municipalities. Each of the municipal corregidores had authority over the whole territory subject to his city; he governed the Spanish population (encomen deros, miners, merchants and soldiers) directly and the Inca popula tion through the native caciques. The encomenderos were supposed to live in the cities, and the only Spaniards authorized to live among the natives wcre the curas doctrineros. In practice, of course, both the encomenderos and the priests interfered to some extent with the authority of the caciques, keeping them busy collecting a large and miscellaneous tribute in kind and furnishing labor for various proj ects. Nevertheless, the caciques had extensive powers, greater in the more remote provinces than near the cities.
The first experiments in establishing direct Spanish rule in the provinces were made by Viceroy Marques de Oafiete (1556-1561), probably as a means of controlling the turbulent encomenderos. He appointed some provincial corregidores but soon removed most of them because he said they were thieves. 27 The only provinces in which the ,. Zavala, 1935 , p. 208. "Gnaman Poma de Ayala, 1936 Zavala, 1935, p. 336, note. 27 Archbishop Loayza to the king, 1566 , in Lisson Chaves, 1943 corregidol'cs were maintained were the crown repartimientos of Chu cuito and Chincha.
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In 1565 Governor Castro revived and put into effect the plan of appointing corregidores de indios in all provinces. In reporting this measure to the king, he said flatly that his purpose was to control the native population, making impossible future conspiracies like the planned Inca uprising which he had just discovered. He proposed to make the natives pay the cost of this measure as a punishment for conspiring to revolt.
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Under the new arrangement the municipal corregidores were re sJlonsible only for the Spanish population, and hence they are called corregidores de espa'iioles. They naturally objected to this reduction of jurisdiction but to no effect. Other objections were made by the r'cligious authorities, whose power over the natives was curtailed by the new arrangement, and by the caciques, who had the most to lose. Archbishop Loayza encouraged the caciques to collect funds to oppose the introduction of provincial corregidores, and they got together 6,000 pesos in a few months. 30 The Spaniards, like other rulers of colonies before and since, always insisted that their administration was in the best interests of the natives. They showed real ingenuity in devising arguments to prove that whatever policy was convenient or desirable for other rea sons was also the solution to all the problems their native subjects complained of. Governor Castro took pains to present the establish ment of provincial corregidores in this light, saying that they would provide the native population with protection from illegal exactions by the parish priests, the encomenderos, and their own caciques. As it turned out, Canete's evaluation of the corregidores was the more aeeurate.
The corregidores de indios were given wide powers. They were responsible for internal security, the collection of taxes, and the ad ministration of justice in their districts. At the same time they served short terms (one or two years if appointed by the viceroy, threc to five years if appointed by the king), they were badly under paid, and there was no regular promotion system by which an able administrator could expect advancement to a better post. Under these conditions, the only incentive to take on the job of corregidor was the opportunity for graft which the post offered because of the wide powers that went with it; the wonder is that any honest men could '" Vega, 1890, p. 116. be found to serve. Most corregidores came to their jobs with one idea, to make a fortune during the brief period of their administra tion. The only way they could do so was at the expense of the natives.
The corregidores were quick to discover methods of exploiting the people subject to their control. The detailed analysis of the situation written by Antonio de Ayans in 1596 reveals that the patterns of the next two centuries had already been established. The corregidores had gone into many kinds of business. They made the natives trans port wine and coca for them to Potosi. 'They forced the women to weave clothing for them for less than half the free market wage. They prohibited outside merchants from trading in their jurisdiction and then brought in goods themselves which they forced the natives to buy at inflated prices, whether the goods were of any use to the purchasers or not. They collected the royal tribute in kind, had it sold at auction, bought it in at half its market value up to the amount due for tribute, and then resold it at the going rate. 31 All this commercial activity was entirely illegal. Magistrates were forbidden to trade with the people under their jurisdiction by a long s(lries of royal cedulas the repetition of which is in itself an indica tion that they were not being obeyed. Lib. V, tit. ii, ley xlvii of the Recopilaci6n summarizes three sixteenth-century decrees on the sub jed and one of 1619. .B'urther mid-seventeenth-century legislation against the commerce of the corregidores is summarized by Lohmann Villena 82 1-1ater cedulas to the same effect were issued in 1681, 1711, 1720, and 1727. 33 .B'or obvious reasons of political morality the viceroys were for bidden to appoint their attendants and retainers to corregimientos and similar posts by a cedula of December 12, 1619. In 1680, how ever, the Duque de la Palata asked for and received permission to grant twelve Peruvian corregimientos to members of his retinue. The privilege was confirmed in 1688 to the Conde de la Monclova and became a normal viceregal perquisite; it was confirmed again to Amat in 1761. 'rhe other sixty-three corregimientos were granted by the king.:
H As was to be expected, the appointment of intimates of the viceroys to corregimientos aggravated existing abuses by increas ing the already excessive powers of the corregidores and making appeal from their judgments more difficult. 35 31 Ayans, ]9:i1, pp. 4]-50. J2 1946, pp. 92·93, 233-243 There were cases of bribery and favoritism in the appointment of corregidores from quite early in the seventeenth century,36 but syste matic sale of such offices only began in the 1670 'S.37 Earlier laws prohibiting the sale of magistracies remained on the books, but they were simply ignored, and both kings and viceroys regularly granted all corregimientos par beneficia if anyone could be found to make an offer. Juan and Ulloa mention the practice as a matter of course in their time (1742) (1743) (1744) (1745) (1746) (1747) (1748) (1749) , indicating that the government justified it as a war finance measure. 38 The royal conscience was evidently troubled from time to time, though not enough to stop the sales; in 1747 and 1748 Viceroy Manso de Velasco was instructed that corregi mientos were to be sold only to persons who were otherwise qualified. 39
'fhe high prices that were paid for provincial corregimientos are an indication of the profits to be made from commercial extortion. The viceroy Duque de la Palata (1681-1689) settled a claim for 26,500 pesos by appointing the claimant corregidor of Cajatambo for three years. 40 'fhe annual salary of this post was 1,000 pesos. About 1741, Manuel de Elcorrobarrutia paid 16,000 pesos for the corregimiento of Chancay and drew no salary for it because he was already being paid as contador.
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The normal salary for this corregimiento was 800 pesos.
Elcorrobarrutia, the principal in the last example, furnished pos terity with a very informative glimpse of how a corregidor managed his business because he asked the opinion of a Lima theologian, P. Diego ,rose Merlos, S.J., as to whether or not he was justified in pric ing thc mules he proposed to distribute to the natives of Chancay at 150 per cent over the cost price and the dothing and other articles at 100 per cent. These, he explained, were the usual rates for such transaetions. To give his spiritual adviscr some information on which to base a judgment, he furnished a budget of his expenses which may be summarized as follows :41a Elcorrobarrutia expected to lose 300 of his mules, so he put his net receipts at 80,000 pesos. He calculated the profits on the mules, there fore, at 12,996 pesos, which he figured as 19% per cent. It is a pity that he did not also furnish us with a budget for the clothing and other goods he intended to distribute. One would like to know how he proposed to make up the other 46,724 pesos he owed for the corregimiento; he would have had to collect at least 55,000 pesos to do it. That would mean a 135,000 pesos business, or 27,000 pesos a year, just to make his expenses. There were 1,225 able bodied adult male natives in the province of Ohancay according to the count of 1754.
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The learned P. Merlo, after 33 paragraphs of close argument and Latin quotations, concluded that the prices Elcorrobarrutia proposed .. 1918 , Vol. I, p. 275. " Orellana, 1859 to charge were just under the circumstances. Then he took up the matter of the corregidor's oath of office in which the magistrate had to swear to obey the royal ordenanzas. One of the ordenanzas pro hibited the corregidores from having any sort of business dealings with the people under their authority, as we have noted. Neverthe less, P. Merlo argued that this regulation was, by 1741, interpreted to mean that the corregidores must not charge excessive prices or use violence to make people buy. This interpretation was justified by referenee to the purchase of the office. The king would not charge beneficio for the office unless he expected the holder to benefit finan cially from it. 44 A eorregidor with a delicate conscience might refrain from using violence in his business dealings, but everyone involved understood that the corregidor was not operating as an ordinary merchant bound by the rules of the market plaee. He was carrying out a reparti rJ//iento, a distribution, in which his agents delivered to every head of a family a quantity of goods determined arbitrarily by the corregidor and for whieh the recipient was obliged to pay at the prices the correg-idor set. Ha If the recipient did not want the goods or thought the prices excessive, he could scarcely take the case to court, for the corregidor was judge of first instance in his province. If the recipient refused to cooperate he faced the fact that the corregidor also had full police authority.
In spite of the dangers involved in going over the corregidor's head to complain, the volume of protest grew so great that the l\Iarqn6s de Castelfuerte, viceroy 1724-1736, complained to the king that all his time was being taken up with grievances resulting from the repartimicnto system. The grievances were also taken to court by the JlIca procurador, Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, and detailed in his ind ignant memorial of 1732. The viceroy had a solution to offer: he suggested that the king legalize the repartimiento and regulate it. Castelfuerte's successor, the Marques de Villagarcia, was instructed to investigate this proposal and report on it. Villagarcia thought it prudent to ignore this part of his instructions.
The next viceroy, Manso de Velasco, 1745-1761, was a soldier who was chosen for the job to meet the emergency created by Juan Santos' Inca rebellion of 1742. He revived Castelfuerte's proposal as soon as he took office, collected opinions on it, and reported favorably to the king. l'he result was a series of cedulas and royal orders in 1751 direeting the establishment of a junta in IJima to draw up sehedules 44 !\lerlo, "l9fJ2.
'" TJJi, type of distribution is to be distinguished from the earlier "eparti rwicnto of [lJdillng. See Kubler, ] 946, PP. ;)74-;)75. of the types of goods to be distributed in each province with the amount and price. Repartimiento up to the amount of the schedule was to be legalized. The junta reported its schedules (aranceles) in 175il, and they were approved by cedula of June 5, 1756. 45 '1'he value of goods to be distributed in the provinces according to the aranceles varied from a low of 10,000 pesos for the Cercado of IJima to a high of 226,750 pesos for the corregimiento of Sicasica. In three corregimientos, Trujillo, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and Apolo bamba, no repartimiento was provided for. The legal amount in Chancay was 122,000 pesos which is 13,000 pesos below the minimum calculated above to make the corregidor's books balance. The corregi dol' thus still had no incentive to obey the law.
What happened in fact was that the corregidores interpreted the new policy as virtually a license to steal, and the lot of the natives, which was already sufficiently difficult under the old system, became markedly harder. Viceroy Guirior noted as much in his relacion de mando of 1780 and blamed the deterioration squarely on the legaliza tion of' the repartimiento. 46 '1'his conclusion is confirmed by the representation made to the king by the cabildo of Cuzco in 1768 (Ciu dad del Cuzco, 1872), by Viceroy Amat's relaci6n de mando of 1776,47 and by the testimony of Miguel .Feij60 de Sosa in 1778. 48 These re ports deseribe a situation which was clearly worse than that of Juan and Ulloa 's time. 'rhe aranceles were not obeyed; they served only as a basis for collecting the alcabala. The corregidores assumed the right to exclude all other traders from their districts. Tribute funds wcre credited to repartimiento payments, so that the king's name could be invoked in making the collections. Furthermore, instead of making one repartimiento in five years, as the law required, the corregidores took to making two or more in their term of office, so that their collections were at least twice the amount of the aranceles. Great brutality had to be used in order to squeeze such sums out of a population which was living on the margin of subsistance to start with.
The caciques, on whom the ultimate burden of the collections fell, objected as strongly as they could, often at great personal risk; as "The history of the measure is given by Amat y ; Junient, 1947, pp. 186-188; Ciudad del Cuzco, 1872, pp. 211-212; and l!'eij60 de Sosa, 1952, pp. 335-337 . See also Manso de Velasco, J859, pp. 151·157; Mariluz Urquijo, 1952, pp. 192-195 ; Porlier, ms., Vo!. I, fo!. 45. My colleague Woodrow W. Borah located a copy of the Peruvian aranceles in the Archivo General de la Naci6n, Mexico (Ramo de Heales Cedulas, Duplicados, Vol. 102, fol. 122-283) and was kind enough to ar range to have it microfilmed.
•• Guirior, 1872, pp. 29-30.
'7 Amat y Junient, 1947.
•• l!'eij60 de Sosa, 1952. officials charged with civil and criminal jurisdiction they had a re sponsibility to do so. The corregidores answered by inventing the doctrine that the caciques' only proper function was that of collecting taxes and rounding up labor for the mita. Any further action on their part was insubordination if not actual treason. In virtue of this doctrine, the corregidores began to depose caciques who tried to defend their subjects and to replace them with new men, often Spaniards or mestizos, who would be properly subservient. The natives were driven in desperation to unplanned and un organized outbreaks of violence, the object of which was to assassinate a particular corregidor or his agents. Amat reports such outbreaks in Sicasica in 1770 and 1771, in Pacajes and Carangas in 1771, and in Huamachuco in 1773 and 1774. The rioting was pitilessly suppressed; in none of these cases was the corregidor punished if he survived the rising. 49 There were similar risings in Chumbivilcas and Urubamba in 1776 and in Huamalles in 1777. 50
The cupidity of the corregidores reached such a point during the period of legal repartimiento that they began to include Spaniards as well as natives in the distribution. 51 The Spaniards were willing to take a share because, if they were in debt to the corregidor, he would protect them against their other creditors until he had collected his own debt. However, there were limits, and when Baltasar de Sent manat, corregidor of Arequipa, made two repartimientos within a year and a half he prepared the way for the bloody urban riots of early 1780. 52
The volume of complaints increased greatly, and royal cedulas were issued in 1768, 1772, and 1778 asking for reports on the reparti miento problem. 53 Thoughtful officials in Peru were very disturbed about the situation, rightly fearing a general revolt if the Incas got desperate enough. Bishop Greg'Ql'io del Campo of La Paz urged that the repartimiento be abolished and the corregidores paid an adequate salary. He said that the natives would be glad to finance the proposal through an increase in tribute if the weight of the repartimiento were lifted,54 Miguel Feijoo de Sosa, corregidor of Trujillo, made the same recommendation in his well reasoned and informative memorial of 1778. 50 Guirior, 1872 , pp. 35-37. 51 Feij60 de Sosa, 1952 Pando, 1952, p. 103. 52 Pando, 1952, pp. 99, 103. 53 Paz, 1952, Vol. II, pp. 327-328, 338; Guirior, 1872, p. 32. 54 Amat y Junient, 1947, pp. 190. 5 . ]<'eij60 de Sosa, 1952. i erm as corregidor of Huaylas, offered to serve a second term without l'epartimiento as an experiment. He asked for a salary of 8,000 pesos a year, to be paid by the natives. 56 The natives were willing, and Viccroy Guirior approved the project. 57 It was too late for experi ments, however, for the patience of the Incas had run out and the whole political picture was changed by the great rebellion of 1780 1782.
The Inca leaders capitalized on popular hatred of the corregidores as soon as hostilities broke out, proclaiming the abolition of the office and of the repartimiento system in all provinces under their control. The measure proved so effective in enlisting support for the movement that the Spanish authorities were forced to make some immediate concessions in order to maintain their position. The Junta de Guerra assembled in Cuzco announced the abolition of the repartimiento on ~ovember 20, 1780. The measure was approved in Lima on December 7 and reported to the king, who confirmed it by cedula of .Tuly 12, 1781. 58 The repartimiento never again became legal in the Spanish Empire, although a proposal to revive it was made by the visitador Jorge de Escobedo in 1784. 59 The very name of corregidor was so odious in Peru by that time that Escobedo and the viceroy made haste to suppress the office, introducing the system of government by in tendentes and subdelegad;os which had long been planned and was already functioning in other viceroyalties. The change was made in Peru in 1784. 60 The reforms seem to have put matters back to approximately the same state they had been in before 1751. The repartimiento continued illegally, and further royal cedulas were issued in 1784 and 1791 against the practice and its abuses.
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In 1804, Demetrio 0 'Higgins, intendente of Huamanga, complained that the subdelegados in his intcndency were distributing 10,000 mules a year at the exorbitant price of 45 to 50 pesos, using the tribute money as capital and paying no alcabala. He noted that no one would take these mules unless forced to do so, since purchasers could get animals more cheaply by buying them direct from the mule drivers. 62 0 'Higgins complained further that royal orders issued between 1792 and 1797 had so modi '6 The regular salary of the corregidor of Huaylas was 1,000 pesos, and he ,vas permitted a repartimiento of 140,000 pesos (Porlim', ms., Vol. I, fol. 168).
61 Guirior, 1872 , pp. 37-39, 52. "Paz, 1952 Vol. II, pp. 433-4:35; Matraya y Ricci, 1819 , no. 1273 6. Croix, 1859, PP. 71-72. 6. Ibid., 6' Matraya y Ricci, 1819, nos. 1350 and 1663. 6. 0 'Higgins, 1918, pp. 347-348. fied the Ordenanza de Intendentes that the subdelegados ended by having almost exactly the same powers as the old corregidores. 63 It was the same old rose, and it had the same smel1.
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MITA. When the Inca emperors needed labor for public works or other state purposes, they drafted it from the most conveniently located provinces. The provincial governors were supposed to see to it that such calls for public service were rotated among the families under their jurisdiction so that no man would have to serve a second time until all the rest had had a turn. A man designated for state service was called mit 'ayoq, having a turn, from mit 'a, turn. This is 1he origin of the Spanish terms mitayo (vecero) and mita, in common use in the Colonial Period.
When Spanish control was first extended to the provinces of the lnca Bmpire, governors, encomenderos and doctrineros made their demands for native labor in the form of orders to the caciques to fur nish a specified number of men for a stated project. The caciques equated these demands with the ones formerly emanating from Cuzco, and they raised their quotas by the traditional method. Thus, any sort of forced labor done for the Spaniards came to be called mita, and the word retained this general meaning throughout the Colonial Pe riod. The word is sometimes understood to refer specifically to service in the mines, a particularly burdensome form of forced labor, but this type is properly designated as mita de minas or more specifically mita de Potosi or whatever the mining center involved might be. Mita labor was also applied by the Spaniards to building and road construc tion, service to travelers in the tambos, labor in privately owned obrajes (factories), the cultivation of Spanish farms, the care of cat tle, and in short, to all types of manual labor. 65 At first the colonial mita system was simply an abuse, for the pri vate profit of the conquerors, of the Inca system of service to the state. Since mita labor had not received any direct wages under the Inca emperors, the conquerors saw no reason why they should pay any. It was only with the greatest difficulty, and after the failure of the armed .3 Ibid., 346.
•• There is further information on corregidores in the valuable eighteenth cen tury study of Caflete y Dominguez, 1952, pp. 341-352 . I note that Lohmann Villena presented a paper on corregidores to the Primer Congreso Internacional de Peruanistas, Lima, 1951 . Only a summary of it has been published, however (Lohmann Villena, 1952) .
•• There are two useful surveys of the mita system in Peru, Basadre, 1939, and Perez Tamayo, 1947 . Basadre writes in general terms; Perez Tamayo, though dealing only with the mita in the Audiencia of Quito, includes extracts of many documents from the Archivo de la Corte Suprema in Quito which give a vivid picture of the actual functioning of the forced labor sYstem. rebellion of encomenderos led by Hernandez Giron (1553 Giron ( -1554 , that the Spanish government succeeded in introducing the principle that native labor should be paid. The legal wage for mita labor, however, was never as high as that paid to native laborers in the free market, and during much of the Colonial Period it was less than the minimum which the laborer needed for his own food. Furthermore, the mitayo was not excused from paying his regular tribute assessment just be cause he was called away to put in several weeks' work in the enco mendero's wheat fields. Naturally, the natives showed no inclination to hire themselves out for Spanish projects on such terms. The Span ish settlers thereupon enunciated the doctrine that" Indians are lazy by nature and must be forced to work for their own good." The government accepted this verdict and used it to justify continuation of the system of forced labor throughout the Colonial Period. The regulations which governed the mita gave first consideration to the wishes of the Spanish settlers for eheap and submissive labor and then added a multitude of ineffectual restrictions designed to protect the natives from the abuses the system invited.
The commonest form of mita, present in all Spanish towns, was the mita de plaza, for construction, farm work, and general service. For example, the Conde de Nieva (viceroy 1561-1564) issued an order that a stated number of laborers should come to Lima periodically from the surrounding provinces as far away as Jauja and assemble daily in the plaza to hire themselves out to residents who wanted to build houses or cultivate their fields. The daily wage set was one real. The free rate for unskilled native labor was two to three reales, and one real was barely enough for the day's food. Furthermore, ,lauja is 40 leagues from Lima in the sierra, ten days' journey on foot, and the mitayos were paid nothing for traveling time. The cacique of J auja was jailed for refusing to force his subjects to eomply with the viceroy's order. 66 The provinces along the main post roads were subject to a mita for service in the tambos or post houses, located normally at intervals of three to eight leagues. The tambo was another Inca institution taken over by the conquerors; tampu was the Inca word for a post house maintained by the state for official travelers. Before the conquest, the post houses had been stocked and maintained by the communities along the road as part of their service to the government. The Spaniards put the system to private use but demanded that the natives maintain the tambos as before. Regulations requiring payment were gradually introduced, but enforcement of them proved impossible 6' Vega, 189G, until Spanisb post masters were appointed, and for many years un scrupulous travelers robbed, cbeated, and beat tbe tambo attendants at will. 'rbere is an extensive literature on tbe subject. 67 Mining was a state monopoly under tbe Inca Empire and, like other state business, was conducted with mita labor. It was done on a very small scale, however, and was not particularly burdensome. The Spaniards continued the use of the mita system for mining, al though foreed labor in the mines was for many years teehnieally forbidden by Spanish law. At first the mines were small and the ore rieh, and loeal labor was suffieient. Wben, however, the quality of the ore began to deeline, as it did at Potosi in the 1560 's, the miners began agitating for more eheap labor. Vieeroy Toledo earried out a major reorganization of Peruvian mining praetiee in 1574-1578, the key measures of whieh were the introduetion of the amalgam proeess of extraeting silver from its ore, using mereury, and the establishment of mita service for the mines on a very large seale. The mercury was mined at Huancavelica, and most of the silver was mined at Potosi, so these were the main centers to which mita labor was assigned. Some smaller gold and silver mines were so favored as well. The Spanish government gave formal approval of Toledo's measures, thus reversing the earlier royal policy that Indians were not to be used for forced labor in the mines. In spite of some very severe criticism and a num ber of serious proposals to abolish it, the mita system remained the basis of Peruvian mining until the end of the Colonial Period.
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The mita of Potosi was both the largest and the most burdensome of the colonial mita arrangements. It drew labor from the whole high land area between Cuzco and Tarija, affecting the lives of some 450,000 people at the time it was set up. As organized by Toledo, it called for one seventh of the adult male population in the provinces affected (14,248 men in 1578) to go to Potosi each year and remain there for twelve months. Each man was supposed to work one week and have two weeks off so the effective labor force distributed among the Spanish proprietors (azogueros) was one third of the total mita; Canete y ' .7 Solorzano Pereira, 1930, Vol. I, pp. 239-250; Vaca de Castro, 1909; Vega, 1896, pp. 117-119; Ayans, 1951, pp. 53-56; Guaman Poma de Ayala, 1936, pp. 527 [541]-533 [5471; Perez Tamayo, 1947, pp. 270-276; Mugica, 1954, pp. 14·17. flO The best general summary of the history of the mita de minas, with refer· enees to the legislation governing it, is that given by Solorzano Pereira (and his continuer), 1930, Vol. I, pp. 308-314. There is some additional information for Potosi in Canete y Dominguez, 1871, pp. 179-181 and 1952, pp. 101-117 . For II uancavelica the story can be extracted from the monographs of Lohmann Villena, 1949a, and Whitaker, 1941 . N early all the relaciones de mando of the Peruvian viceroys have something to say on the subject. Most of the secondary literature on the mita de minas is of very poor quality. Dominguez gives 4,724 men as the figure for 1578.
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The effective labor force was called the mita ordinaria. The men were expected to work a twelve hour day, five days a week, with Sunday off and Mon day devoted to straightening out the week's work assignments. Apolo gists for the mita since the seventeenth century have pointed out that the system only required four months' forced labor once in seven years from a given individual. There is nothing wrong with the arithmetic of this statement, but it gives a very inadequate picture of what the mita meant to the men who served in it.
Our best picture of the economics of Potosi mine labor is given by Autonio de Ayans, writing in 1596. 70 The daily wage of free labor at Potosi at this period was 12 reales. At this rate, a man could earn 30 pesos (of 8 reales) a month. Ayans estimates that a miner's monthly expenses for food alone would come to 28% pesos; other obligations, including taxes, would bring his total needs up to 60 pesos if he was the head of a family. Ayans does not suggest how the d[~ficit ('ould be made up, but one obvious way would be for the la borer's wife and children to work also. Another source of additional illeome was provided by the right of k'apcha (share) which the work men enjoyed. Over Sunday, when Spanish mining operations were suspended, any Indian who wished to do so could enter the mines ami extract ore for himself. Evidently the opportunity was not wasted, for a sample account for the years 1773-1777 indicates that more silver was turned in to the Banco de Rescates by k 'apcha workers than by the Spanish proprietors in each of the years in question. 71 The figures suggest some interesting reflections on the efficiency of Spanish mining operations.
The wages paid to the free laborer (mingado or alquila) were thus only about half his subsistence requirements. The wages of the mitayo, or ind·io de ccd1tla, were fixed by law at 4 reales a day, or one third of those paid to free labor. He only had to work for this rate one week out of three, however. The other two weeks he could work at the free rate. Thus his monthly earnings would be either 20 or 25 pesos, de pending on whether his turn at forced labor came up once or twice in the month. The legal wage for mitayos remained the same for two hundred years, while the free labor rate fluctuated somewhat with the labor supply and the cost of living. 'fhe free labor rate always re mained higher than the mita rate, however.
The financial problems of the mitayos were aggravated by the fact '" C':tflete y Dominguez, 1952 , p. 101. 70 Aynns, 1951 , pp. :36·41, 59-73. " F'l'ij(,o de Rosa, 1952 .
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that they had to leave their homes and travel long distances to work in Potosi. Ayans reports that it took the mita contingent from Chucuito two months to travel the hundred leagues or so to Potosi ;72 it mnst have taken the mitayos of Tinta and Quispicanchi three months. The mitayos usually took their families with them, and they had to take their own food and bedding for the trip, so the pace was set by the strength of the small children and the independence of the pack llamas. IJegally, the mitayos were supposed to be paid for their travel time; in practice, they were paid nothing at all for it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Spanish proprietors said that they were retaining the travel money for the trip to Potosi to compensate themselves for shortag'es in the number of mitayos who arrived and the money for the trip home on the grounds that the mitayos were in debt to them. 73 Later, in the eighteenth century, the proprietors paid the travel money for the return trip only, not a very serious financial burden because nowhere near all the mitayos who came to Potosi re turned horne again. Also, the pay rate was low. It was 1jz real per league, and the mitayos did about two leagues per day. Furthermore, the proprietors counted the leagues in round numbers and from Potosi to the nearest town in each province, not to the mitayo's home. 74 In effect, the mitayos paid their own travel expenses. Ayans gives a graphic pictnre of the departure of the mita of Chucuito in the 1590 's, an exod us of 7,000 men, women and eh ildren with over 40,000 llamas and alpacas for food and transport. 75 In addition to paying their own travel expenses, the mitayos had to bring a "present" (1'ilcuchilc1~Y) for the Capitan Mayor de la Mita and the Alcaldes Veedores del Cerro. Furthermore, they had to pay about twice as much tribute as they normally paid at home, the bizarre theory behind this law being that the Indians were earning hard money in the mines, whereas at home they were just farming. 77 Working conditions deteriorated rapidly. In the 1590 's the mine workers were put on double shift, a p'unchaw-runa (day man) being replaeed at sunset by a t1~ta-runa (night man). About 1610 the pro prietors deeided that they were losing time ehanging shifts, so they started keeping the workmen underground continuously from Monday evening to Saturday evening. The pickmen were distributed in teams of three; one worlwd while the other two ate or slept in the mine 72 Ayans, H151, p. 36. 73 Sol6rzano Pereira, 1930 , Vol. T, p. 310. 74 Cafiete y Dorninguez, 1952 Ayans, 1!l51, p. 36. 7" Cafiete y Dominguez, 1952, p. 108; Mora Chima Capac, 1732 , p. 17. 77 Messia Venegas, 1951 behind him. The shifts were timed by candle; when the candle burned out it was time to change. The pick was an iron bar weighing twenty to twenty-five pounds and the ore was a rock so hard that observers compared it to flint. The mine was damp and the air bad. This continuous work system was never legal, but it remained in effect throughout the seventeenth century. The viceroy Conde de Lemos made a determined effort to stop it in 1670, but the proprietors refused to comply, threatening to close down the mine if the order was en forced. 78 Caiiete y Dominguez, writing in 1796, describes only night work in the mines and does not make it clear what changes in working.. hours had taken place since the time of the Conde de Lemos. 79 In the eighteenth century the greatest source of abuse of mine labor was the use of work quotas, another illegal practice. '1'he pick work was done by volunteer labor and the mitayos had the job of carrying the ore out of the mine to the sorting yards. The ore was carried in a leather sack holding 100 lbs., and each mitayo was ex pected to complete a quota of twenty-five sacks of ore (one palla) in twelve hours. The wage of 4 reales was cut proportionately if the quota was not met. Given the depth of the mine, access to which was provided only by long ladders, the quota was an impossible one, and the only way a mitayo could meet it was to hire an assistant (yana pakoq) out of his own pocket. In addition, although the ordinances stipulated that mitayos were to be given two candles a night, they were only given one and had to pay for the second themselves. so Under such conditions, many mitayos ended their year in debt and unable to go home until they could earn enough as volunteers to pay their obligations. When and if they did go home after an absence of thirteen to eighteen months or more, depending on distance and debts, they would be dependent on the charity of their neighbors while they tried to get their abandoned farms started again. Many pre ferred not to go home at all but to abandon their houses and land and go to work on some Spanish hacienda in a strange province where, until 1732, their status as forasteros made them legally exempt from mita service, and, in practice, from tribute also. The most common goal of this migration was the Yungas frontier of Carabaya and Larecaja which was not subject to the mita of Potosi at all.
Each escape of this sort increased the burden of those who stayed at home. 'rhe mita quotas decreased much more slowly than the de crease in the number of originarios available to meet them, and the T8 Lohmann Villena, 1946, pp. 265-268 proprietors of Potosi were merciless in their insistence that the quotas be met to the last man. If the number was short an officer was sent, at the Indians' expense, to collect the missing men and complete it.
8l
I n an effort to increase the pressure on the originarios to stay home or return, the caciques were made responsible for filling mita quotas. Marcos Thupa Amaro, uncle of the Inca rebel leader, who served as cacique of Surimana from 1750 to 1766, was bankrupted by the seizure of a train of mules and a hundred pesos' worth of goods because his mita quota was one man short.
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The corregidores could give their subjects no protection, because the governor of Potosi had the author ity to suspend any corregidor who failed to dispatch the mita. 83 As a result of all this relentless pressure by the Potosi proprietors, it be came necessary to send men back to Potosi after much less than their theoretical period of six years at home between turns. As early as 1596 there were cases in which a man was sent back to Potosi as soon as he got home. 84 Even so, the mitas were chronically short.
It was possible for a man who had property to buy his way out of the mita, either by hiring a substitute or by making a cash payment. In Chucuito in 15D6 it cost a man the equivalent of 426 pesos to hire a substitute, a good indication of how much the mita was dreaded. By the middle of the seventeenth century mining was less profitable, and the proprietors were willing to accept cash payments (indios de plata) instead of mitayos. The amount collected from each mitayo in 1655 was 250 pesos. Theoretically the proprietor was supposed to use the money he received to hire a volunteer to do the mitayo's work, but many proprietors preferred to turn their indios de plata into indioS' de faltriquera by pocketing the money and doing that much less mmmg. This practice was a nightmare to the Spanish authorities but they were never able to stop jt. 85 Conditions were similar in the other mines. At Huancavelica they were worse because many mitayos djed slowly, azogados, from breath ing the poisonous mercury dust. 86 Mita labor was also assigned to the obrajes or factories in which manufacturing was done in the viceroyalty. This practice, and in deed the obrajes themselves, had no Inca precedent. Under the Inca Empire manufacturing was a state monopoly, and the work was done by full time specialists supported out of state revenues. The obraje was a European institution which acquired some special char acteristics in America. The earliest one in Peru is said to have been a cloth factory at Sapallanga (Jauja) established probably in the 1550 'S.87 The number of obrajes increased rapidly, and Viceroy Toledo found it necessary to regulate working conditions in them in 1577. 88 The seventeenth century was the period of greatest pros perity for obraje operation, but this type of manufacturing continued to be an important part of the Peruvian economy until independence was established. Then the flood of English goods that entered the country swept away local manufacturing except in the most remote districts.
Thc majority of the obrajes turned out woolen and cotton cloth by the yard on foot-treadle looms of European type. 89 The panos de Quito were cspecially renowned and were traded all over South America. There were also some obrajes devoted to the manufacture of cordage and sacking, sandals, felt hats, leather goods, gunpowder, and arquebus fuses. 9o Many of these factories were very impressive establishments. At San Jose de Conchacalla near Pomacanchi (De partment of Cuzco) are the ruins of an obraje which was sacked by Thupa Amaro in 1780; the loot is said to have amounted to 13,000 pesos and twenty piaras of cloth. 91 The buildings of the obraje were solidly constructed of masonry and adobe with two large patios, a chapel, a fulling mill (batan), and a grist mill. Smaller manufactur ing establishments were called chorrillos.
Most of the obrajes were owned by individuals (particulares), not infrequently by encomenderos or priests, although it was supposed to be illegal for either group to have business dealings with the natives entrusted to them. Other obrajes belonged to religious orders and a few directly to the crown. Many Indian communities established their own obrajes in the second half of the sixteenth century, operat ing them as a means of paying their tribute assessments. Manufac turing was too lucrative a business to be left in native hands, how ever, and Viceroy Luis de Velasco (1596-1604) began to appoint Spanish administrators to the obrajes de comunidad.
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The salaries of these administrators were high by colonial standards; the adminis trators of the obrajes of Quito got from 1,200 to nearly 2,000 pesos a 87 Cnppa, 1891, pp. 32-33, 37. BB Toledo, 1925. •• Interesting details of the work done in a textile obraje are given in the records of the .Jesuit obraje of Cacamarca in 1703, published by Romero (1923) . 80 Perez Tamayo, 1947 , p. 172. " Paz, 1952 , Vol. I, p. 234. "" Cappa, 1891 Percz Tamayo, 1947, p. 184. year in 1639, more than the pay of most corregidores. 93 Such appoint ments proved a convenient way of taking care of the viceroy's re tainers and dependents at the expense of the natives. 94 Naturally, there were many abuses, and the administration of the obrajes de comunidad was notoriously inefficient. The protectores de indios pro posed as a remedy that these obrajes be leased to individual Spaniards, and some were being so leased by 1620. 95 Finally, in the first half of the eighteenth century, the government ordered the obrajes de comu nidad sold at auction. They were bought up by individual Spaniards at ridiculously low prices,96 'fhe obrajes seem to have been granted the services of 100 to 400 mitayos each. Most of these were boys 9 to 17 years old; for example, the obraje of Nuestra Senora de la Limpia Concepcion de Yaruqui was assigned 12 adult mitayos and 100 boys in the visita of 1683. 97 This system had several advantages from the employers' point of view. Tn the first place, the ordenanzas set the wages of boys at much less than those of adults. In the second place, boys were not subject to most other types of mita service, so the expansion of manufacturing did not cut into the general labor supply as badly as it would if only adults had been used.
According to the Ordenanzas de Obrajes of 1664, the mita for obrajes was supposed to be taken from communities not more than two leagues away, and the mitayos were to be paid % real per league for travel money. In the sierra of Lima and Charcas, the mita was to be one seventh of the men (or boys) available; on the coast one sixth, and in Quito one fifth. The mitas were supposed to change every six months. In the work year the mitayos were to be allowed forty days off to take care of their crops and up to one month's sick leave with pay. The legal work day was from 7 A.M. to 5 or 6 P.M. with half an hour off for breakfast and two hours for lunch. Weavers and nappers were supposed to be paid 47 pesos 2 reales a year except in the district of Cuzco where the salary was 56 pesos 4 reales. Other adult workers got 40 pesos 4 reales (in Cuzco, 48 pesos 4 reales). Boys were to be paid 24 pesos 2 reales (in Cuzco, 28 pesos 3 reales). All workers were also entitled to six pounds of meat a week or one real a day for their food. This pay scale is considerably higher than the one set in Toledo's ordenanza of 1577. 98 D' Perez Tamayo, 1947 , p. 187. D' Cappa, 1891 . DO Ibid., . DO Perez Tamayo, 1947, p. 20l. D7 Ibid., pp. 195-197. 9 . Benavides de la Cueva, 1664; Toledo, 1925. The obraje system was subject to many abuses and hence was a source of constant complaints. The managers gave their workmen excessive daily quotas and punished those who failed to complete them. They made the men work through rest periods or after legal closing time. They deducted fees and charges from the men's payor forced them to accept cloth instead of cash. The work rooms were usually kept locked to prevent the workmen from moving around and loafing. The obrajes usually had their own illegal stocks and prison cells with which to punish refractory workmen, and the lash was used freely. The owners of obrajes hired professional bullies called guatacos (watakoq), mestizos, negroes, or mulattoes whose job it was to track down fugitive laborers or force them to come back by terrorizing their wives and children. Regular bribes were paid to the corregidores, and visitadores were silenced by payments or threats. oo Two incidents may be cited which throw much light on the way in which obraje labor was regarded by Spaniards and natives. One is that 89 persons implicated in the abortive Inca rebellion of 1737 were condemned to work in the obrajes as punishment. loo The other is that the Indians of Chinchaicocha offered in 1623 to serve in the dreaded mita of Huancavelica if they could be excused from obraje service. lol It should be noted that not all obrajes were served by mita labor. 'I'he ones that had no mita assignment used instead "free" labor which in some respects was even worse off than the mitayos. The men wue encouraged to accept advances and were kept thereafter in a state of debt servitude, sometimes for life.
LAND. In Inca territory, as elsewhere in Spanish America, the Colonial Period saw the growth of land ownership by Spanish fami I ies. By the time of independence much of the best farm land had passed from Inca into Spanish hands, although, since the Europeans and criollos mostly refused to work, the labor on these estates was done by natives in a state of peonage. This much is common knowl edge, but, curiously enough, little research has been done on the process by which the colonial revolution in land tenure was accom plished. The only studies on Peru known to me are papers of 1879 and 1900 by Enrique Torres Saldamando.
It was once assumed that encomienda grants included the granting of land, and statements to this effect can be found even in recent publications. lo2 The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming.lOS But if the eneomienda was not the origin of Spanish land holding, what explanation is there for this important phenomenon?
1\1 ueb land was taken by Spanish settlers, many of them also en comenderos, in the early years of the conquest. The Inea system of taxation involved payment in labor, not in kind. In eaeh district certain lands were set aside for the support of the government and the state religion, and the inhabitants furnished the labor to cultivate these lands. They paid nothing to the government from the produce of their own fields. The system provided a form of social security also, for there was usually a surplus in the government's share, and the surplus was made available to any district where the crops had failed. When the Spaniards overthrew the Inca regime, they claimed the government land for the Spanish king as successor to the Inca em peror.
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Then the cabildos of the newly founded Spanish munici palities assumed the right to make land grants and granted much of the Inca government land to individual Spaniards. The early volumes of cabildo reeords are full of such grants, although nothing is ever said about prior ownership.
The exactions of the Spanish population bore most heavily on the Inca land holders, the hatun-runa who paid tribute and were subject to mita service. As noted in the previous section, Spanish law left one loophole for escape if a man became desperate enough. Mita and tribute were assessed only on the inhabitants of a given province who belonged there by birth and descent (originarios); outsiders (fo1'a steros) were not subjected to these obligations until 1732. 105 Hence, a man could escape several of the most crushing burdens of the colo nial system by fleeing to another province. To do so he had to aban don his house and land, of course. Title to it would fall ultimately to his community, which might be tempted to sell it as surplus land or rnig'ht lose it outright if a Spaniard with money and influence claimed it was in the public domain and offered to buy it from the king. An anonymous report of 1775 gives some idea of the scale on which this abandonment of property proceeded. In the districts of La Paz and Chuquisaca, the ones chiefly affected by the mita of Potosi, 58% of the able bodied men were forasteros. Cuzco had 38% forasteros and If namanga 2811'0. No district in the viceroyalty of Peru had less than 20 % forasteros. 1 0 6
At the same time that the flight of men to other provinces vacated land which could be added to Spanish estates, the migration provided the labor needed to work the growing haciendas. The refugees arrived destitute and were happy to be allowed to work a small plot on a Spanish estate even on the most disadvantageous terms. The process described was cumulative throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; as more men fled the mita service there were fewer left to meet the provincial quotas and the burden on the survivors became increasingly heavy. It seems probable that only the general ineffi ciency of the Spanish colonial system prevented the total uprooting of the surviving Inca population.
The early grants of land to Spaniards were made freely to en courage settlement and reward services to the government. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, however, Philip II found himself ill serious financial straits complicated by the loss of the Great Armada in 1588. One of the measures his government devised to meet the emergency was a general review of Spanish land holding in the colo nies, grantees to pay a fee for confirmation of title (composici6n de tierras). At the same time the colonial authorities were urged to sell off as much of the vacant public land as possible without taking land needed by the Indians. Orders to this effect were given in two cedulas of November 1, 1591. 101 These orders were put into effect in Peru by the fourth Marques de Canete (viceroy 1590-1596) , and the results were highly profitable to the royal treasury. The matter seems to have been handled with some discretion, for comparatively few com plaints were made by the natives.
In spite of the revenues received from Americ:l, the economic posi tion of Spain continued to deteriorate, and by Imn the government was so desperate for funds that Philip IV ordered a new composici6n de tierras, this time with instructions that even persons who claimed land without legal title might secure such title by making a satisfac tory payment. 10~ The Conde de ChinchOn, who was viceroy of Peru at the time, protested this dangerous measure, but the king wrote him in 1634 that it must be enforced.
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The Spaniards in Peru imme diately took advantage of the invitation to claim more land, and the lllHnplaints of the natives grew so urgent that in 1648 the king ordered a review of all the composiciones resulting from the cedula of 1631. ll1 ced ulas of 1651 and 1654 Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra was ordered to organize a ,Tunta de Tierras y Desagravios de Indios. It functioned until 1662. 110 The review of land titles was entrusted to visitadores de tierras who traveled through the provinces hearing complaints. As an ex ample of the procedure followed, we can take the case of the native village of Qorwani in the valley of Abancay. The complaint of the villagers was presented through their caciques to the visitador Fray Domingo de Cabrera IJartaun in 1656; their petition alleged that the lands of the village were insufficient. The visitador had a count of the villagers made and measured their lands. To determine whether the lands were sufficient or not, he applied the rule that each tribute payer should have 4 tuptt of land and each dependent 2 tupu,1ll The cacique principal was supposed to have 16 tupu and the segunda per sona 8. Twenty tupu were allowed as a margin for population in crease and 10 for commons. The total population of the village was 556, and Fray Domingo found that their lands were 266 tupu short of the minimum needed. He told the villagers to choose this amount from among the best lands taken from them in the composici6n and gave them possession of the parcels they selected. 112 If this case is a fair sample of the procedure followed in the visita it is easy to understand how so much land passed into Spanish hands in the Colonial Period. No effort was made to return all lands un justly taken from the natives. The sole object of the visita was to ensure that each tribute payer had a farm of minimum size left to him, using a formula which allowed about nine acres for the support of a family of' five persons. '£his quantity of land would be a medium allotment for a peon on an hacienda in the same area today.
'l'he major legislation on land problems in the eighteenth century appears to be that included in the cedula of October 15, 1754, repro d uced by Ots Capdequi. 113 This decree also provides a loophole by which lands claimed in excess of those covered by titles presented for confirmation could be acquired by payment of fees.
There was a permanent court in Lima to handle land sales and composiciones from 1720 to 1782, and revisitas are mentioned for 1722-25 and 1786. 114 Opportunities were thus always available for further acquisition by Spaniards of lands formerly belonging to the natives, although the process probably proceeded more gradually than in the bonanza period between the orders of 1634 and 1648, Some 111 1'he tupu of Abancay was one twelfth of a fanegada. Since the fanegada was an area 288 varas by 144 varas, each tupu measurcd 72 varas by 48 varas, thus equalling about three fourths of an acre (Expediente de tierras de Qorwani, ms.; d. Torres SaJdamando, 1900b, p. 85. The original Inca tupu was about 100 by 50 varas (Cobo, 1890-95, Vol. IV, p. 224) .
11. }]xpedientc de las tierras de Qorwani, ms. 113 Ots Capdequl, 1946, pp. 167-174. 114 Torres Saldamando, 1900b, pp. 87-88; Croix, 1859, PP. 91-95. detailed information on the methods used by Spanish residents to get lands from the Indians in the eighteenth century is given by Juan and Ulloa,u5 DOCTRINA. The general pattern of native religion in the Andean area at the time of the Inca conquest was the worship of a multitude of supernatural powers which the Incas called generically wak'a (usually rendered naca or g1taCa in sixteenth century Spanish rec ords). These wak'a were the spirits of particular places (mountains, lakes, springs, rocks) and their power was consequently local. Certain very important wak 'a like 'l'iti-qaqa on the Island of Titicaca and Pacha-kamaq at Pachacamac were more generally revered, and pil grims journeyed from great distances to visit their shrines. Most of the wak'a were represented by portable cult objects, usually images or curiously shaped stones. In addition to the wak 'a, Andean peoples generally worshipped some nature deities which were identified with heavenly bodies or natural forces such as the sea or thunder.
The great Inca organizer, Pachakuti (1438-1471), devised a new state religion which he imposed on all his subjects. Existing cults were not molested, except that many of the more influential wak 'a were taken to Cuzco and enshrined there as symbols of imperial unity. People were, however, expected to worship the Inca gods in addition to their own. The Incas were just as interested as the Spaniards were later in spreading the" true religion," and they used their desire to do so as a justification for conquest. Pachakuti's doctrine emphasized worship of a great creator god and, under him, of a group of nature deities of whom the Sun was the most important. There was an or ganized priesthood headed by a near relative of the emperor.
The Spanish invaders were little interested in learning about Inca religion, and few of them ever understood it. They did not disbelieve in the existence of the Inca gods; they regarded them rather as per verse and dangerous manifestations of the Devil which could be vanquished with the aid of the Holy Trinity, the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints. Our Lady made a miraculous appearance at Cuzco during the conquest to help the Spaniards in battle, just as the Inca creator god occasionally appeared to men in a moment of crisis. Since the chief moral justification of the Spanish conquest was that the pope had commissioned the Spanish kings to win the inhabitants of the Indies to the True Paith, efforts were made from the first to convert the natives of Peru. Pachakuti's religion was so closely identified with the Inca state that it was generally discredited on the collapse of Inca power; many, especially among the Inca nobility, were ready to accept the Spanish religion on the grounds that its efficacy was proved by the success of Spanish arms. The worship of the wak 'a was not so easily given up, however, and the natives attempted to do as they had done under Inca rule and add the cults of the conqueror to their own.
The Spanish priests and soldiers tried to make their point of view clear by destroying native shrines and building churches where the shrines had stood, but they were handicapped by a lack of knowledge of the language and lack of understanding of the details of wak 'a worship. It was not until after 1550 that systematic lists of native shrines began to be made, and the first printed grammar and diction ary of the Inca language did not appear until 1560. The encomen deros do not appear to have taken too seriously their obligation to provide" religious instruction" to the natives entrusted to them, and thc number of priests available was hardly adequate to the task. In 1565 Governor Castro complained to the king that, although some 300,000 persons had been baptized, it would be hard to find forty real Christians in the number.
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As noted earlier, the Inca government in exile in Vilcabamba stirred up a great religious revival in 1565 as part of a plan for a general rebellion. The religious movement was called taki-'onqoy (dance sickness) ; it was propagated by itinerant preachers who taught that all the wak'a had corne back to life and were being marshalled by Pacha-kamaq and Titi-qaqa into two armies to attack the Christian god. The Inca people were urged to desert Christianity and return to their traditional rites. The taki-'onqoy had one new feature; in stead of giving oracles through regular priests at the shrines, the gods now spoke through persons who became possessed. Fr. Francisco de la Cruz wrote to the king in alarm that more than 200 native religious leaders had been found in the province of H uaylas alone. 1l7 The Spanish authorities moved promptly to deal with this emer gency, and e(~clesiastical visitadores were sent out to combat the Inca religious rev ival by destroying more shrines, arresting native religious leaders, and preaching. With the fall of Vileabamba in 1572 and the removal of the natives from their traditional settlements and asso ciated places of worship in Toledo's resettlement, the religious re It came as a real shock to the Spanish churchmen in Peru when, in 1608, P. ]<'rancisco de Avila, Inca-speaking priest of San Damian in Huarochiri, discovered that his parishioners, though cooperative enough in public, were still practicing virtually all their traditional rites in secret. It took the authorities two years to convince them selves that A vila knew what he was talking about; then visitadores were appointed and a large scale campaign of extirpacwn de la ido la/ria was undertaken. 1l8 The activities of the visitadores de idolatria were similar to those used in Europe by the Inquisition (Holy Office) for the suppression of heresy. The Inquisition existed in Peru, of course, but it was not supposed to have jurisdiction over the Indians. The bishops therefore had to set up their own machinery for finding and punishing natives who persisted in clinging to their own religion. The procedure of the visitadores engaged in such work is described in some detail in the reports they filed with the bishop on the completion of their assign ment. The visitador was an ecclesiastical judge, and he was sent out with a full complement of notaries and other assistants. When he entered a native village he made a public announcement of his com mission and invited all persons having knowledge of "idolatrous" practices to "relieve their consciences" by informing him. A few informers were usually forthcoming. The visitador then collected t(~stimony by questioning privately all persons implicated. Accused persons against whom there was considerable evidence were subjected to torture if they refused to confess; a whipcord applied to the thumbs was the usual method,119 When sufficient evidence to convict had been assembled, the visitador pronounced sentence. Cooperative and penitent sinners were given light sentences such as sweeping out the church for a period of two to six years. More obstinate ones had their hair cropped, were given fifty lashes, and were ordered to live ill a town distant from the shrines where they had been convicted of worshiping. The persons sentenced were warned that if they re lapsed they faced more serious sentences such as four years' service in the galleys of Callao for the men and perpetual servitude in a Ilima eOllvent for the women. There was a special reformatory called Casa de flanta Cruz in the Cercado of Lima, founded by the Principe de '18 Avila, 1918, pp. 57-98; Arriaga, 1910, pp. 1-10. '18 The eord was twisted on the thumbs until the blood spurted. eordeles was one of the eomlllonest methods of juc1ieial torture used in Europe at the time.
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I~squilache, for convicted native priests. 120 Cult objects were publicly burned and crosses set up at the native shrines. Offerings, stored crops, and domestic animals belonging to the wak 'a were sold at auction and the proceeds applied to the salaries of the visitador's assistants. IJands belonging to the wak'a were turned over to the local church. Copies of the records of the trials were deposited in the church and with the eorregidor of the province so that the local civil and religious authorities could keep an eye on the persons sen tenced.
The bishops found it necessary to send out visitadores de idolatria periodically throughout the Colonial Period. For example, after the first round of trials following Avila's discovery, visitadores were sent to the province of IIuarochiri in 1642, 1660, 1700, and 1723. In spite of all persecutions, however, the records of the later visitas indicate about as much persistence of native religion as the earlier, though the Spaniards seem to have been successful in reducing the number of native priests. 121 In the end it was the Inca point of view that triumphed in most areas. Christianity was accepted as a second religion, while the tra ditional worship was carried out as well, sometimes secretly and some times in the open. The way in which the combination is made today has been analyzed recently by Nllnez del Prado.
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Considering the incessant persecutions to which it has been sub jected throughout the past four hundred years, the survival of native religion among the Incas is a surprising phenomenon. Christians in general are experts at religious persecution, partly from their own historical traditions of suffering from it, and the Spanish church had a long record of successful suppression of heresy at horne. Why did it fail in Peru 7 One reason was certainly negligence on the part of the parish priests who did not maintain sufficient vigilance over their parishioners between visitas. A reading of the visita records for I I Ilarochiri suggests that native reactions also had something to do with it. 'l'he priests visualized resistance to conversion only in the form of defiance. The Incas, however, resisted by yielding, and the visitadores found their behavior incomprehensible. Persons accused 12() Cobo, 1882, pp. 140-141. 121 The foregoing account of visitas de idolatria is put together from the records of the visitas of Huarochiri and Ambar (Chancay) in the Archivo Arzo bispal, Lima. These records were found by George Kubler in 1948-49 and he was kind enough to call my attention to them. A selection of them was made by Nancy C. Gilm('r and transcribed for the Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley. Miss Gilmer used this material for an M.A. thesis (Gil· mer, ms.). On the question of "idolatria" see also Kubler, 1946, PP. 400-406. >2, Nunez del Prado, 1955, pp. 15-18. of idolatry would confess all, give up their cult objects without com plaint, and promise to be good Christians. As penitent sinners, they would be given relatively light sentences. The visitador would then return to I~ima and report the complete success of his mission, while the natives quietly made themselves new cult objects and went on with their ancient rites. The frustration and exasperation of the visita dores at such conduct is quite clear in their reports, but they never found an answer to it.
No doubt a third factor in the failure of the Spaniards to win the 1ncas away from their native religion was the close identification of the church with the Spanish government. This is an aspect of colo nial affairs which is often misunderstood, even by students of Spanish American history. The organization of the church in the Spanish dominions was entirely controlled by the king through his right of patronazgo, and the church was as much an arm of the government as the army or the fiscal administration. Military and financial sup port for its activities was provided when necessary, and ecclesiastics were expected to do all in their power to encourage loyalty and obedi ence to the civil government in the population at large. On at least two occasions, mentioned above, Spanish priests in Peru reported to the government information about plans for rebellion which had been revealed to them under the seal of the confessional, and such action was considered highly meritorious.
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The church in Peru was operated by, and primarily for, the Spanish population of the country. The second Provincial Council of I~ima (15G7) forbade the ordination of Indians and mestizos and ordered that they be admitted to no church office above that of sacri stan or acolyte. 'rhe Incas complained to Pope Gregory XIII (Feb ruary 13, 1583) but without any immediate result. A century later the Congregation of the Council directed that Indians, mestizos and mulattoes not be barred from ordination. 124 Finally Charles II made the ordination of Indians legal by cedula of March 12, 1697. Some attention was paid to this order in Mexico, but it was ignored in Peru. At the complaint of Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, the Inca procurador, the cedula was reissued in 1725. It still had not been obeyed when it was issued for the third time on September 11, 1766. 125 This time some attention seems to have been paid to the royal wishes, for a num 123 ManHo dc Velasco tc ' the king, Scptembcr :; 4, 1750 , in Loayza, 1942 The cedula of 1766 incorporates the other two. It was printed by order of Viceroy AnUlt find then reprinted in 1767 at the expense of la naci6n indiana del Peru. See Vargas Ugarte, 1949b, pp. 1:; 6·130; Paz, 1952, Vol. II, pp. 282-287. bel' of Incas were ordained before the end of the Colonial Period; .Justo Apu Sahuaraura, Gregorio Choquehuanca, and Vicente Pazos Kanki are examples that come to mind. The government's grip on the chureh was slipping, however, and eeclesiastics took a prominent part in the Cuzco rebellion of 1814.
Not only were Indians barred from ordination for most of the Colonial Period in Peru, they were also not given the Eucharist. The First Provincial Council of Lima (1551 Lima ( -1552 ordered that the only saeraments administered to Indians be Baptism, Penitence, and Matri mony, Bishops were permitted to grant Confirmation in individual cases. Indians needed a special authorization from the bishop to re teive the Eucharist. The Second (1567) and Third (1582-1584) Provineial Couneils relaxed these restrietions on paper, but a pattern had been set which continued to modern times. Pena Montenegro noted that in his time (1666) parish priests commonly refused the Bucharist to Indians in Quito, and Vargas Ugarte says that until quite recently it was commonly refused to Indians in the Peruvian sierra.
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Thus there was no native clergy during most of the Colonial Pe riod, and the native laymen were not admitted to full participation in the sacraments. Even those Incas who became fully converted and devout believers were treated as second class Christians, a status which they found understandably irksome. 127 Native parishes were not administered exactly like parishes in l'lurope. In America a distinction was made between Spanish parishes (curatos) and Indian ones (doctrinas), necessary in the first place because a priest was supposed to demonstrate proficiency in the native language in order to hold a parish of the latter type, and in the second place beeause there was a speeial body of church legislation governing doetrinas. In the doctrinas, children were obliged to attend classes daily, early in the morning, and were supposed to be taught prayers, the catechism, church music, and reading and writing by the cura or by a specially appointed teacher. The instruction in reading and writing was seldom given in practice; Spaniards had a deep mistrust' of literate Indians. Adults were supposed to attend compulsory cate chism classes on Volednesdays, Fridays, and Sundays, and attendance at Mass on Sunday and feast days was also obligatory. The cura ap pointed native police officials (fiscales and alguaciles) to round up the congregation for these occasions. Loayza, 1948. qnently jnterfered with by mita obEgations, but Spanish authorjtie~ usually gave the natives Sunday off so that they could attend Mass. 'l'he curas WE're supposed to examine thejr native parishioners at least once a yeaI' on their knowledge of Christian doctrine and impose pub I ic penance on those who gave unsatisfactory answers.
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The cums doctrine/'os had special authorization to impose corporal punishment for religious offenses. The Synod of Quito of 1596 estab lished the following schedule of penalties: eontumaejous concubinage or separation of husband and wjfe, 50 lashes; faHure to confess, 24 lashes the first time and 50 lashes the second; failure to attend Sunday l\1ass, 24 lashes the first time and 50 the second; eating meat on F'riday, 24 lashes in public the first time and 50 the second. The lash consisted of three straps about two feet long, according to Gua man Poma's illustrations; it was the same instrument used in punish ing civil offenses. 129 The police power legally entrusted to the curas doctrineros was thus very considerable, and it was increased in prac tice by the fact that the civil authorities in Inca villages were natives, while the priests were Spaniards.
Abuses of power by the curas doctrineros becan:e so common that a man who did his duty was likely to be praised for exceptionally meritorious conduct. One of the commonest abuses was assessing il legal dues under the guise of gifts; each parishioner might be required to bring an egg to Sunday Mass, for example, or the congregation might be assessed a sheep a week for the cura's table. Many priests claimed that the long tradition of usage made such assessments their right. lao Illegal fees were commonly charged for ehurch services of all kinds; the fees for funerals were likely to be especially high. An other abuse was requiring unpaid personal service, either under the guise of penance or as a form of mita. It was usually the women, children and old men who were called on for this service, for the adult men were kept busy by the corregidores and encomenderos. l31 It was also quite common (and still is in the sierra) for the curas to keep one or more native concubines and raise large families of children (" 80 brinos"). Guaman Poma was probably right in attributing to the curas a major role in the growth of a mestizo population in the rural areas. la2 Unhappy as is the general picture of the relationships between the Spanish church and the Incas, it must not be forgotten that there were always some ecclesiastics who championed the natives, often with great courage and spirit, against the economic extortions to which they were subject and the brutality of secular Spaniards. The first such de fenders of the Incas were Dominicans like Domingo de Santo Tomas and Bartolome de Vega. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, ,Jesuits became prominent in this field; Antonio de Ayans is an out standing example. In the eighteenth century it is Franciscans who stand out, and some, like Antonio Garro and Isidoro de Cala y Ortega, were deeply involved in the protests of the Inca nationalists of that period.
Our survey of the Spanish colonial institutions which most directly affected the Incas can be summed up by saying that Spanish colonial rule was characterized by economic exploitation and personal degra dation of the natives. Both features were carried to an extreme which is difficult to credit unless one is familiar with the closely similar conditions in which the Incas of today live under the domina tion of the descendants of their colonial masters.
Apologists of the Spanish colonial regime have claimed repeatedly that the laws themselves were humane and that native complaints re sulted from the failure of local officials to carry them out. Such a claim can be made only by a partisan selection of the laws considered. 'I'he laws which required forced labor at inadequate salaries were clearly exploitative, and so was the law which permitted the forced sale of goods at fixed prices. Other laws were, to say the least, dis criminatory, like the ones which limited native land ownership to a low maximum figure while permitting the indefinite growth of Span ish estates. The assignment of Indians to forced labor in the mines equated them legally with Spaniards guilty of "atrocious" crimes, for only the worst criminals were sentenced to this type of labor in Spain.
All Spaniards had a hand in the exploitation of the Indians, from the king down, and royal protestations of solicitude for Spain's American subjects cannot be accepted as giving an adequate picture of royal policy. Some of the worst abuses of the colonial system arose from such royal decisions as the sale of magistracies and the legaliza tion of invalid land titles in return for payment. Measures like these, besides being directl.)' harmful, had a demoralizing effect on subordi nate officials. Bribery became an accepted feature of colonial life as the king' 's loyal subjects followed His Majesty's example.
However often the king protested the contrary, the colonial system permitted and even encouraged the exploitation of the native popula tion by eivil and religious officials and by miners, manufacturers, merchants, and soldiers for their own profit. Spaniards in these cate gories either had legally or assumed tacitly excessive powers over the natives. They were so rarely punished for abusing the natives, even when their extortions led to armed rebellion, that they felt quite free to ignore inconvenient laws and instructions. The courts functioned largely for the benefit of the Spanish population, and it was virtually impossible for a native to obtain justice in a civil suit where his opponent was a Spaniard, European or crio11o. The attitude of the courts is reflected by the decree issued by the Audiencia of Lima in 1563 that the testimony of two Indian men or three Indian women be considered equal to that of one Spaniard. 133 No wonder the Incas revolted. 
